This article outlines the current situation with regard to the Lord's Resistance Army and the possibilities for peace in Northern Uganda. It seeks to add to the discourse on rethinking Africa's international relations in the context of a specific conflict and with regard to a specific tool of the international community: the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its involvement in issuing warrants for insurgency leaders in October 2005. The article discusses the role of traditional justice systems and the ICC in ending the war, concluding that justice in Northern Uganda requires an end to the false dichotomy of 'traditional' and ICC approaches and that the two must complement each other in order to address the different groups within the LRA and the Acholi population.
Introduction
This article outlines the current situation with regard to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the possibilities for peace in Northern Uganda. It seeks to add to the discourse on rethinking Africa's international relations in the context of a specific conflict and with regard to a specific tool of the international community: the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its involvement in issuing warrants for insurgency leaders in October 2005.
It is argued that the ICC represents a particular expression of the 'English School' or 'International Society' approach to International Relations (IR) whereby a particular view of what constitutes international law and, by extension what constitute human rights, can be enshrined in a world society. 2 Furthermore, the ICC, through independent action and the appointment of an Independent Prosecutor, is theoretically capable of transcending states. 3 The article contends that external actors operate within a standard, or at least coherent idea of how to resolve conflict based around the idea of the liberal peace. Furthermore, the liberal peace can be characterised as a key part of the relationship between the international community and Africa.
The implication of the current state of the peace talks and the approach to peace taken by Uganda and international actors is that peace is likely to fail. This is not entirely down to the failure of the ICC, and is as much down to the involvement of other states in the conflict, including Sudan, the DRC and Central African Republic, divisions within the LRA itself and also the inability of the ICC to fulfil its mandate.
The article does not argue against the idea of the ICC and certainly does not see 'traditional justice' as an obvious way out, as has been suggested in Uganda, or even for a complete withdrawal of the ICC. Rather it argues that due to the history of the conflict the ICC approach is unlikely to achieve peace since there may be a significant group of rebels who will reject the involvement of the ICC, and also the ICC's inability to act beyond the purview of the Ugandan state, which has an interest in the outcome of any public hearing. Consequently the people of northern Uganda are left excluded from any form of justice system since they are left with a form of traditional justice that implies a lack of external involvement, particularly from the Ugandan Government. The only possible answer, therefore, is that justice in Northern Uganda requires an end to the false dichotomy of 'traditional' and ICC approaches and that the two must complement each other in order to address the different groups within the LRA and the Acholi population.
This article begins by outlining the involvement of the ICC and the assumptions underlying its approach. It takes a long-term view of the conflict in northern Uganda, seeing Kony's current violence as part of a long-term cycle of violence 1 . The article briefly outlines the nature of the conflict and then moves on to look in more detail at the intervention of the ICC and the accompanying rebranding of the LRA as 'terrorists'. The politics of this approach have specific implications for any outcomes from a peace process in the region and also the future of ICC intervention in support of liberal approaches to peacebuilding based around global ideas of human rights and rule of law.
The ICC and the liberal peace
The background to the formation of the ICC and its link to international relations more broadly is most clearly seen through the link to international society, as outlined by IR scholars to mean universal individual rights in the Grotian tradition, that are constituted by individuals and non-state groups and recognised by them, rather than through rights as defined by states. 4 The Rome Statute itself in many ways represents an expression of liberal views of universal human rights that seek to protect the individual from justice that is the sole preserve of the state. This expression of human rights is at the very core of liberal peace theories of postconflict reconstruction.
A comprehensive discussion of the liberal peace is beyond the scope of this paper, but essentially the core argument is very simple. Following John Gray (1986), the liberal ideology can be reduced to four core themes: individualism (assertion of individuals over social collectivities); egalitarianism (moral equivalence of 1 Joseph Kony is the leader of the Lord's resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. He is a notoriously difficult and enigmatic figure, claiming magical powers and ruling the LRA severely through internal pogroms and a cult of personality. He claims to be possessed by a series of spirit advisers. These include Silly Silindi (a strategist), Ing Chu (who turns tanks into toys), Juma Osiris (Amin's former minister and once leader of the West Nile Front) and Major Bianca (his American head of intelligence). individuals); universalism (moral unity having primacy over historical association or cultural forms); and meliorism (belief in the ability to improve all political and social institutions). All of these elements surround the core principle of individual freedom.
Given the above, a liberal peace exists when all of the above constitute normal social relations. For peace to exist, justice and liberty are required, and the liberal political arrangements that make this possible are seen as inherently peaceful. Critically, democracy and capitalism are seen as the vehicles for peaceful competition underlying liberal structures where even loser groups can have faith in a system that does not oppress their beliefs (Doyle, 1997) . Michael Doyle goes on to add that the normative foundations of liberalism are encompassed in the liberal notion of human rights. At their highest level these are the right to freedom from arbitrary authority, the social rights necessary to protect and promote freedom and the right to democratic participation to protect the first two (Doyle, 1997) . Consequently when international intervention is undertaken in the name of human rights it is entirely coherent to initiate a process of democratisation as a means of developing social rights, including juridical equity (Liden, 2005) . Clearly it is the transfer of the political architecture of the liberal state from western liberal countries to non-liberal states in the form of state-building that leads to a tension between the pacific nature of liberalism and the issue of whether those structures really are the political manifestation of the moral freedom of the local populations (Liden, 2005) .
This has led to a number of important developments in terms of peacebuilding, not least the idea that a post-Westphalian international liberal peace requires non-liberal states to be liberalised in order for that peace to become sustainable. Consequently, the chief aim of peace operations changes from creating negotiated solutions between states to actively contributing to the construction of liberal states, economies and social structures intended to spread liberal-democratic political structures (Bellamy and Williams, 2004) . It is this idea that Mark Duffield claims lies behind the merger of security and development policy and the reproblematisation of security as both the result of, and precondition of, development more broadly (Duffield, 2001 because of the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the situation is somewhat precarious. For example, the statute has not been implemented into Ugandan law and stands in potential opposition to the Amnesty Act, until this is repealed or lapses.
Inevitably this means that the ICC in Uganda is dependent upon the Ugandan state, which is, of course, a protagonist in the conflict. It also means that effectively the ICC has been asked to deal with criminal activity that is outside the control and capacity of the Ugandan judicial system. This not only means that the ICC is effectively acting on behalf of the Ugandan state, but also implies that if the peace process requires the withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrants on Kony and others, it is incumbent on the Ugandan state to supply evidence that any justice approach adopted is now within the capacity and jurisdiction of the Ugandan authorities. At a minimum this puts the ICC into an extremely difficult situation since the use of international human rights legislation appears to have been utilised to the benefit of one side in a conflict -and one that is partly complicit in similar activities to those being investigated.
Indeed, Allen (2005) , amongst others, suggests that a move to re-examine traditional justice as an alternative to the ICC warrants is partly due to a realisation on the part of the Ugandan Government that the LRA, if accused, will be able to prepare a defence as part of any trial and this could prove to be extremely embarrassing for the Ugandan Government. Furthermore, there is clearly an advantage to using traditional systems since it implies that the Acholi are somehow 'primitive' and not ready for modern judicial systems, in addition to the treatment of the insurgency as an internal
Northern Ugandan conflict not involving outsiders, rather than the regional conflict that it became. The traditional justice systems discussed to date will not include the Government of Uganda as an active protagonist in the war and are designed to facilitate forgiveness and reconciliation within communities.
Kony himself is subject to an ICC warrant and divining his intentions have proved extremely difficult. He is clearly the spiritual leader of the LRA as well as the heart of the insurgency. However he is unlikely to submit to a transitional justice system that he sees as externally imposed and does not provide a platform for an adequate defence. Clearly several local Acholi leaders had confidence in local amnesties and traditional justice processes that were being discussed with the LRA, but they have been greatly unsettled by the idea that this could be undermined by western ideas of justice that make Kony and others individually responsible for LRA atrocities. By 2005 this had reached such a stage that the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, discussed these issues with several Acholi leaders and reassured them that the ICC warrants would not undermine local efforts (ICC, 2005) . However, it is difficult to see how Kony himself could submit to local justice approaches and at the same time escape the ICC. For him, therefore, giving himself up is an unlikely outcome and he is likely to stay in the bush. The only question remains how far he is likely to take up violence.
The LRA, the Acholi and the marginalisation of Northern Uganda
Both Acholi leaders Alice Lawkena and Joseph Kony blamed the sins of the Acholi themselves for almost destroying their group 2 . They both believed that the Acholi were about to be wiped out in massacres and reprisals driving them to look for a spiritual escape. Whilst it would be an obvious conclusion to draw that the religious 2 Alice Lawkena is a pivotal figure within Uganda as the leader of the then Holy Spirit Mobile Force, which later partly changed into the LRA. Alice herself is a complicated story. The Holy Spirit Lakwena is the spirit of an Italian who died during the First World War and this spirit took possession of Alice on May 25 th 1985. First, Lakwena directed Alice towards healing, but then redefined her purpose as the head of the HSM. Some former soldiers joined Alice and won a small skirmish at Kilak Corner in November 1986. This victory convinced several others that Alice did indeed have 'the power'. She persuaded her followers to wear oil and amulets as protection from bullets and controlled her force through a series of bizarre 'commandments' including banning taking cover behind anthills. The HSMF was remarkably successful in the short term, partly since Uganda troops, faced with hymnsinging in response to bullets must have found it unnerving. The HSM was finally defeated just outside Jinja in 1987 cover was just that: a cover to disguise a deeper political motive, it is difficult to sustain this in the face of the evidence. Clearly one of the key drivers of such a long conflict is fear (See Jackson, 2002 , Vinci, 2005 . When the National Resistance Army (NRA) took power in 1986, the remaining Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) forces, most of which were led by Acholi, fled north, fearing reprisals. Civilians in Acholi-land also feared the worst. The history of political takeovers in Uganda had not been a happy one and the Acholi had been involved in several massacres as either perpetrators or victims. Their fears were partially confirmed in several clumsy actions by the Government and in the actions of some NRA soldiers.
These events fed the paranoia already rampant amongst the Acholi. Eventually, fear led to despair at the lack of development and vast numbers of people became susceptible to the belief that the end was near for the Acholi. Despair led to desperation and Alice offered them a way out: redemption. Her argument was that the Acholi have found themselves near economic destruction and need to reject past failures. Alice's solution was a rejection of modernity and a retreat to spiritualism based on the traditional cosmology of the Acholi with added Biblical elements. This was carried forward by Kony and the events of 1994 and his 'betrayal' by Acholi elders appears to have hardened his outlook. His desperation in the face of Acholi indifference in many cases, led to his turning violent on his own people. The young were abducted, because not only were they easier to indoctrinate, but also because Kony had effectively given up on the adults (Jackson, 2002; Vinci, 2005) . This left the majority of the population stranded between the LRA on one hand and a hostile army on the other, leading to widespread marginalisation that feeds into current demands for justice and rehabilitation.
The civilian population is both the key and the victim. The widespread internment of civilians in camps and the abduction of children effectively leaves the population in a constant state of fear and insecurity. Abduction of children and their incorporation into the LRA creates a negative support network amongst the Acholi. Virtually every extended family in Acholi-land has had someone abducted. Families of the abducted are less likely to support the Government against their own family and so '… your own child is living as a rebel. So if the rebels come through and demand food or information, it is not only your fear for yourself, you think also of your child, and hope that your own child is not hungry' (Human Rights Watch, 1997).
How can a combatant with a malevolent cel (spirit) go back to the community he/she has committed violence against? One of the core features of this war has been that Westbrook (2000) estimates that the cattle population of Kitgum fell from 156,667 to 3,239, whilst the national cattle stock rose from 3 to 5.6 million. The Acholi certainly believe that the Government and the army were implicated in the theft of their cattle (Finnstrom, 1999) . It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of cattle to the peoples of northern Uganda. Cattle represent the bedrock of the economy and the main way of accumulating capital.
Cattle provided a significant source of draught animals, food, wedding dowries, and acted as a means to settle disputes. Removing cattle from Acholi-land effectively removed one of the main roots of Acholi society. Consequently the marginalisation of the Acholi has been partly mental and partly material. There is a lot of evidence that the rebellion is fairly clearly based on quite rational, historically-grounded, material grievances and security fears in northern Uganda. However, this goes along with a mystic/religious/cult character of the LRA and its predecessors. Where the balance lies is important for how a peace might be negotiated -if it's the former then Government deals (power sharing, redistributive deals for example) and security arrangements might be sufficient for peace.
However, the combination of a lack of trust of the Government and a paranoid ideology adds a significant variable into an already fragmenting LRA. On a pragmatic level it is not actually clear, beyond Kony himself, who has any authority to negotiate on behalf of the LRA in any peace process. It is against this background that the Ugandan Government invited the intervention of the ICC.
Ceasefire, amnesty, the ICC and a liberal peace
A liberal peace relies on the twin pillars of individual rights and economic freedom backed up by democratic representation producing peace in itself, without of course recognising that there is evidence to suggest that they can be sources of further conflict (Sriram, 2007) . In addition, the idea of a liberal peace representing a global hegemony in a Gramscian sense relies in part on the existence of a local hegemony that is lacking in the African state (Taylor, 2007) . In the Ugandan context, the state became a vehicle through which various competing groups tried to access resources and power -the Acholi amongst them. The root of the current insurgency can, in fact, be seen in the replacement of an Acholi elite by an alternative led by Museveni.
However, it is part of the premise of this paper that the LRA has diverged considerably from this original root, and that conventional peace negotiations along the lines of power-sharing, are likely to lead to dysfunctional outcomes. Among all of these discussions the people of northern Uganda wait for an improvement in their position. Caught between an army that they do not trust because of an unfortunate history, and the LRA, which has been peculiarly vicious in its pursuit of the Acholi, northern Ugandans hold deeply fissured views of the LRA.
On the one hand they are 'the enemy' but on the other the LRA largely consist of abducted children from these communities. Dolan (2005) puts forward the view that the war is just a mask for perpetrating mass social torture on the population with all sides and other actors keeping the war going for this purpose. For the peace process, this means that a wider range of actors have to be drawn in to recognise that the war is about more than the LRA versus the Government. Consequently, the people of northern Uganda tend to be very much in favour of any approach that will end the violence. represented by the ICC warrants represent an external imposition to many Acholi that could make the behaviour of the LRA even worse (Sriram, 2007) .
What are the likely outcomes of current approaches?
This is clearly a complex situation on the ground. However, the approach to peace followed by Uganda is in danger of failing on a number of levels, not least at the level of the ICC and the international community. A close association with the Ugandan state in terms of the enactment of the warrants has tainted the approach in the eyes of many Acholi. However, there is a danger of turning down a route to justice that relies solely on traditional justice mechanisms, even if it could be decided what those mechanisms might be. 9 In particular, a change in stance of the Government towards the acceptance of traditional justice mechanisms can be viewed as an attempt to avoid its own complicity in the conflict coming to light in a formal court, which would undoubtedly happen if the ICC were to prosecute the case.
For the Government of Uganda the advantage is in containing the war within the Acholi and of branding it as an internal war with which they have had very little contact, which is clearly untrue. This would lead to a situation where the Acholi were forgiving their own kind using traditional mechanisms because they were not viewed as being sophisticated enough to use modern judicial systems (Allen, 2005 ).
An important question is whether the ICC's perception (and practice) of justice could be effective in bringing in the LRA and Kony in particular. This remains a difficult question and is not helped by the dichotomy constructed between traditional justice systems on the one hand and formal systems on the other. It is clear that Kony will not come in merely in response to the warrants although it is also clear that the involvement of the ICC has moved the peace process to a position of more promise. 10 However the LRA view the ICC warrants as being an instrument of state blame for the violence placed squarely on them, whereas the LRA see themselves as fighting state oppression, which is not recognised by the ICC.
Similarly, the traditional justice approach is not without difficulty and it is doubtful whether anyone, including many Acholi, would allow Kony to be 'forgiven' and then just to carry on living in Gulu. However, the two approaches are not mutually example, may not represent the position of Kony himself, although as always this is also unclear. What is possible is that different elements of the LRA will respond to conventional negotiations, material settlements and security guarantees, but that these groups would effectively split from Kony's core group. The question remains just how isolated would he become and how small a group would be left.
All of the above analysis begs questions about the likely outcomes of pursuing a liberal approach to peace. The history of the conflict leads to three likely consequences of these actions: continued action by Kony; conflicts within the LRA;
and an escalation of violence but on a smaller scale.
Questions remain over how many of the LRA are likely to remain loyal to Kony. Given that no-one actually knows how many members of the LRA there are, it is difficult to put numbers on this. What is clear is that there have clearly been strong disagreements within the LRA leadership itself, leading to telephone calls to the local press denying any splits, but then strong rumours of Otti being killed by Kony. The defection of several key individuals along with around one hundred combatants in 2007 has raised further doubts.
The LRA is clearly divided. The history of the peace talks has been, on the LRA side, distinctly opaque. There are a number of different groups who claim to be negotiating on the part of the LRA, but it is certainly not clear who is actually negotiating on behalf of Kony himself.
Finally, the question remains of what is likely to happen if Kony and some members of the LRA stay in the bush. One outcome is that they could effectively live in exile, however, given the gradual escalation of the conflict, one possible outcome is that a smaller LRA carries on its campaign of extreme violence and begins kidnapping children again. This is clearly the fear of several Acholi elders, and in their view is made more likely by taking a very western approach to constructing a liberal peace through using liberal methods of transitional justice and setting in train a number of approaches -free markets, democracy through political parties -based on
